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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The rise of China, both in military and economic over the last decade, has drawn 
attention to international politics, especially in Asia Pacific region. Its defence 
expenditure, which increased 11.7 – 20.3 per cent1 annually, according to many 
observers, has brought instability to the region. Although the government of China has 
acknowledged that its military expenses are reasonable and at appropriate level for its 
economic development, it inevitably leads other states in the region to seek greater 
military capabilities. They may strengthen their forces both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. In other words, Pacific countries endeavor to enhance their military power 
by increasing their respective defence budget as well as military collaboration with 
other countries in order to counter China. 
Apparently, the security dilemma has occurred in the region. China has increased 
its military expenditure very drastically. The rise of China’s military power 
subsequently causes Pacific countries mainly those that continue to have territorial 
disputes with China, to feel vulnerable and less secure. This situation then forces them 
to put in more efforts to modernize their defence capabilities as a response. This is 
particularly true for Japan, which will be the focus of this research. In response to China 
military – as well as in relation to North Korea’s nuclear program – Japan has 
strategically changed its defence policy. Instead of Russia being a threat as in the case 
during the Cold War era, China and North Korea are now considered a threat. This is 
clearly mentioned in 2010 Japan’s Defence White Paper.  
As declared by its authorities, Japan decides both to empower its self-defence 
power and strengthen its alliance with United States. To enhance its defence power, 
Japanese government has revised its defence strategy over the last ten years. They also 
arrange a New Defence Program Outlines (NDPO) starting from 2001 which mainly 
prepared JSDF (Japan Self-Defence Forces) to support the US campaign war on 
terrorism in Afghanistan and United Nations Peace Keeping Operation. Therefore for 
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the first time, after its security agreement with US in 1951, Japanese government has 
approved its defence forces to own power projection capabilities.2 This strategy then 
continued until 2009, as proposed in National Defence Program Guideline 2005-2009, 
with a stronger cooperation with US and to play a greater role in both regional and 
global security. Furthermore, Japan has recently proposed “Dynamic Defence Force” 
strategy, which permits its Defense Minister to shift the land forces to mobile forces.  
Furthermore, with regards to Sino-Japan relations, the action-reaction strategies 
between two neighboring countries not only promote tensions for both parties but also 
create insecurity for other Pacific states. Although the superpowers in the region have a 
strong economic cooperation, their defence policies may create instability in Pacific 
region. This is particularly true as currently tensions coupled with some unresolved 
problems on territorial dispute remains existed. This is not to mention the perception of 
China as a revisionist power in the way it approaches Taiwan. These situations seem 
less likely to support peace and stability in the region. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
By looking at the above description, thus this research is aiming to establish an account 
on Japan’s responses against China’s defence policy and its impact to instability in 
Pacific region. This research will particularly analyze the change on Japan’s strategy 
and how this strategy is implemented. Thus, here are some questions that will be 
answered in this research: 
1. How does Japan view the security dynamics in Asia Pacific, and particularly 
the China military strategy?  
2. Why and what factors have triggered Japanese government to transform its 
policy?  
3. What is the impact of China and Japan shifted military strategies towards the 
stability in Asia Pacific? 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	   “Japan’s	   New	   Defense	   Posture	   Towards	   Power	   Projection”,	   in	   The	   International	   Institute	   for	  
Strategic	   Studies	   Strategic	   Comments,	   volume	   10,	   issue	   8,	   October	   2004	   accessed	   from	  
http://www.iiss.org/Easysiteweb/getresource.axd?AssetID=699&Type=Full.pdf	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1.3 Research Objectives 
This research mainly aims:  
1. To describe China’s and Japan’s respective military strategy.  
2. To analyze the factors and reasons why Japanese government transforms their 
policy in responding China’s strategy.  
3. To examine the Japanese government’s military strategies and how they are 
implemented. 
4. To examine the impact of the ‘action-reaction’ military strategy between China 
and Japan in Pacific region. 
 
1.4 Concepts & Theories 
Every country certainly has their respective national interests, which involve their 
goals, objectives and aims. This interest includes the wealth, health and education of 
people in certain state. In addition, national interests covers protection and security to 
their territory, people and natural resources from any threats that may come from 
internal or external power. National interests are so important that every decision 
makers will consider prior to decide their policy. All countries around the world may 
prioritize her national interest differently. Yet, according to May Rudi national interests 
essentially involve security and prosperity.3  
Etymologically, security comes from Latin words, ‘securus’ which means 
liberation from uneasiness, or a peaceful situation without any risks or threats.4 As 
acknowledged by many observers, concept of security now has developed into non-
military and multidimensional issues, such as environment, poverty, illegal drugs, 
human trafficking, illegal migrant, terrorism and infectious diseases.5 However, 
traditionally, security remains associated with one’s military capability in dealing with 
other’s military force. Moreover, military power is essentially needed by states for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	   T.May	  Rudy,	  Studi	  Strategis	  Dalam	  Transformasi	  Sistem	  Internasional	  Pasca	  Perang	  Dingin,Bandung,	  
Rafika	  Aditama,	  2002,	  pp.116-­‐117.	  
4	  	   Anak	  Agung	  Banyu	  Perwita,	  “Redefenisi	  Konsep	  Keamanan:	  Pandangan	  Realisme	  dan	  Neo-­‐Realisme	  
Dalam	  Hubungan	  Internasional	  Kontemporer”	  in	  Transformasi	  dalam	  Studi	  Hubungan	  Internasional	  
Aktor	  Isu	  dan	  Metodologi,Bandung,	  Graha	  Ilmu,	  2007,	  p.	  26.	  
5	  	   Nurani	   Chandrawati,”Perkembangan	   Konsep	   –	   Konsep	   Keamanan	   dan	   Relevansinya	   Terhadap	  
DInamika	   Keamanana	  Negara	   –	  Negara	  Berkembang”	   in	  Global	   Jurnal	   Politik	   Internasional,	   Vol.	   II,	  
No.8,	  June	  2011.	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certain goals and it can vary from one state to another. Buzan perceives that military 
capability is used to act intentionally and physically against an object or an unwilling 
person either defensively or offensively.6  
Similarly, Art tries to broaden the purposes of deployment of military forces by 
stating that it serves at least four utilities: defense, deterrence, compellence7 and 
swaggering. Although Art explained the differences of these purposes explicitly, in 
practice, these purposes can be overlapping. It may not be easy to distinguish each of 
these purposes when they are implemented. To some extent it is difficult to ascertain 
whether a state’s military power is used for defence, offence or both goals - particularly 
for states which have disputes for certain period of time. In addition, it is difficult to 
determine whether its military force is for deterrence or simply swaggering strategy.  
Military power can be used both as threats and as rewards.8 Notwithstanding, in 
this anarchical system the realist scholars will argue that military power will make you 
feel more threatened than being rewarded. This perception is heightened when a 
neighbor state acquires more power than your state. Regarding this, Rousseau argues 
that the weak position of one’s military power increases the perception of threat. This 
happens because nothing in this self-help international system can prevent one state 
from using force against others to resolve a conflict.9  
Accordingly, threat perception can be created when a state feels insecure or less 
secure due to other’s arms modernization. Although Cohen says a threat can be inferred 
either from a certain signal of intention or the adversary’s capability,10 the perception 
itself is worsened when the motives and the reasons behind the other’s military build-up 
are ambiguity. Moreover, it is not easy to figure out a state’s military acquisition 
purpose by examining its motives and reasons, stated in the government’s documents or 
declared by its spokesmen. A state may explain its intention and justification to 
modernize its weapon through defence diplomacy as well as confidence-building 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  	   Ibid.,	  p.	  131.	  
7	  	   Robert	   J.	  Art	  use	  the	  term	  “compellence”	   instead	  of	  coercion	   in	  his	  article	  “To	  What	  Ends	  Military	  
Power?”	   in	   International	   Security,	   Vol.	   4.	   No.	   4,	   Spring	   1980,	   pp.	   3-­‐35,	   as	   he	   was	   influenced	   by	  
Thomas	  c.	  Schelling	  in	  his	  Arms	  and	  Influence,	  New	  Haven,	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1966,	  pp.	  69-­‐86.	  
8	  	   David	  L.	  Rousseau,	  “Identity,	  Power,	  and	  Threat	  Perception	  A	  Cross-­‐National	  Experimental	  Study”	  in	  
The	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution,	  Vol.	  51,	  No.	  5,	  Oct	  2007,	  pp.	  744-­‐771.	  
9	  	   Ka	  Po	  Ng,	  Interpreting	  China’s	  Military	  Power:	  Doctrine	  Makes	  Readiness,	  NY,	  Taylor	  &	  Francis,	  2005,	  
pp.	  1-­‐14.	  
10	  	   Raymond	   Cohen,	   Threat	   Perception	   in	   International	   Crisis,	   London,	   The	   University	   of	   Wisconsin	  
Press,	  1979,	  p.	  5.	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measures but these actions cannot stop others from having their own perception towards 
its strategy.  
This situation certainly provokes security dilemma, which defined by Kegley and 
Wittkopf as:  
“The central problem faced by all sovereign states in an anarchic global 
system in which a state’s arming for ostensibly defensive purposes 
provokes other states to arm in response, with the result that the national 
security of all declines as their armaments increase.”11 
Furthermore, Posen perceives security dilemma as a situation when a state put efforts to 
enhance its security. This will accordingly evoke reaction from other states and in the 
end it will lead the initial state to feel less secure.12 Similarly, May Rudi explains 
security dilemma as a process where all parties feel insecure. This happens when 
defensive military posture of a state is perceived as an offensive one by others. In 
response to this perception, other states then arm themselves to secure their interests.13 
In other words, security dilemma happens when a state’s modernization of weaponries 
considered as a threat by others.14 Buzan also confirms that when the action-reaction 
component of the arms dynamic remains strong, the security dilemma is active.15 
Butfoy explains how this security dilemma is caused by the sense of threat 
especially when there is uncertainty in others’ perception.16 About this, Jervis perceives 
that security dilemma can evoke tensions.17 This in turn provokes states enter to arms 
race. Regarding such relationship, Intriligator and Brito define "arms race" as an 
interactive acquisition of weapons by two or more states.18 Hollist also emphasizes the 
Richardson’s proposition, which mentions that states increase their military capabilities 
primarily in response to the increasing armaments expenditure of an identifiable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  	   Charles	   W.	   Kegley	   and	   Eugene	   R.Wittkops,	  World	   Politics	   Trend	   and	   Transformation,	   New	   York,	  
Bedford,	  2001,	  p.	  102.	  
12	  	   Barry	  R.	  Posen,	  "The	  Security	  Dilemma	  and	  Ethnic	  Conflict"	   in	  Survival,	  Vol.35,	  No.	  1,	  Spring	  1993,	  
pp.	  27-­‐47.	  
13	  	   T.	  May	  Rudy,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.169.	  
14	  	   Angel	  Damayanti,	  “China’s	  Military	  Rise	  and	  Its	  Impact	  on	  Instability	  in	  East	  Asia”,	  in	  Sociae	  Polites,	  
Jakarta,	  FISIPOL	  UKI,	  Special	  Edition,	  November	  2011,	  pp.	  184-­‐185.	  
15	  	   Barry	  Buzan	  &	  Eric	  Herring,	  The	  Arms	  Dynamic	  in	  World	  Politics,	  Colorado,	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  
Inc.,	  1998,	  p.	  209.	  
16	  	   A.	  Butfoy,	  “Offence-­‐Defence	  Theory	  and	  The	  Security	  Dilemma:	  The	  Problem	  with	  Marginalizing	  The	  
Context”,	  in	  Contemporary	  Security	  Policy,	  Vol.	  18,	  No.	  3,	  December	  1997,	  pp.	  38-­‐58.	  
17	  	   Robert	  Jervis,	  Perception	  and	  Misperception	  in	  International	  Politics,	  Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  1976,	  p.	  67.	  
18	  	  	  Michael	  D.	  Intriligator	  and	  Dagobert	  L.	  Brito,	  “Can	  Arms	  Races	  Lead	  to	  the	  Outbreak	  of	  War?”	  in	  The	  
Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution,	  Vol.	  28,	  No.	  1,	  Mar.	  1984,	  pp.	  63-­‐84.	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opponent.19 Glaser also notifies that the state’s security environment causes the arms 
race. Moreover, he postulates that arms races are more likely when states are equally 
powerful.20  
 
1.5 Methodology 
This research will focus on Japan’s threat perception, in relation to China military 
strategy. To what extent China policy is considered as a threat by Japan and what is the 
impact of Chinese and Japanese military strategy in the Asia Pacific region are the main 
question in this research. Accordingly, this research will conduct area studies 
methodology focusing on Asia Pacific. In order to collect data that are needed to 
support our argumentation, we will conduct library research as well as interviews. The 
researchers will collect data from books, journals, newspapers, magazines, coupled with 
some documentations form Japanese government such as its White Defence Papers and 
reports regarding their strategy that are published. In addition, interviews will be carried 
out with the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. This is important for gaining 
direct information and confirmation about Japan’s position in some issues with regard 
to Chinese government’s military strategy. 
 
1.6 Research Design  
To answer the research questions as abovementioned, this paper will be divided into 
five chapters. The first chapter involves introduction, research question, research 
objectives, concepts and theories, methodology and research design. Chapter 2 will 
explain China’s military strategy. This is important as to examine Japan’s perception on 
China’s policy and how it is feeling threatened by the policy this research should 
initially describe the Chinese government’s military strategy. This chapter will be 
continued by an analysis on Japan’s perception towards China’s military policy and 
how Japanese government subsequently responses it. Chapter 4 will explain the impact 
of Sino-Japan defence strategy towards stability in Pacific region. And eventually, this 
research will provide conclusion in Chapter 5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  	   W.	   Ladd	   Hollist,	   “An	   Analysis	   of	   Arms	   Processes	   in	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union”	   in	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  3,	  Sep.	  1977,	  pp.	  503-­‐528.	  
20	  	   Charles	   L.	   Glaser,	   “When	   Are	   Arms	   Races	   Dangerous?	   Rational	   versus	   Suboptimal	   Arming,”	   in	  
International	  Security,	  Vol.	  28,	  No.	  4,	  Spring	  2004,	  pp.	  44–84.	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Chapter 2  
China’s Defence Strategy 
 
2.1 The Development of China’s Defence Policy 
Over the last decade, China has significantly performed its development, both in 
economic and military. In conjunction with her economic development, Chinese 
government confirms its military budget enhancement. When the Chinese government 
issued her National Defence White Paper - 2010 on March 2011, they declared that the 
implementation of its peaceful development is combined with the pursuit of defence 
military strategy.  
The spokesman of China’s Ministry of National Defence mentioned that for 
defensive purpose, the expenditure was mainly used for the personnel, training and 
maintenance, and equipment.21 He explained that the increase of China’s military 
budget in the last two years is for improving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s 
living standards of both active and reserve forces. The budget is also allocated for 
supporting the diversified military tasks in terms of military operations other than war 
(MOOTW), and encouraging the Revolution Military Affairs (RMA) in this country.  
The idea about strengthening China defence system itself has actually begun since 
1930s. This was where there were two main strategic components, namely territorial 
and coastal defence system. This part, therefore will explain the development of China 
defence policy, starting from Mao Zedong era. 
 
2.1.1  Protracted People’s War by Mao Zedong (1930s) 
Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Revolutionary, developed the so-called 
Protracted People’s War strategy in 1930s. It was the period when there was a civil war 
between the supporters of Chinese government (Kuomintang) and Communist Party of 
China (CPC). Chiang Kai Sek led Kuomintang and oppositely Mao Zedong conducted 
Chinese Communist. Mao’s People War strategy ultimately emphasizes on human 
power. Accordingly, operation of infantry and guerilla war was the main core of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  	   White	   Paper	   of	   China’s	   National	   Defense	   in	   2010,	   can	   be	   accessed	   from	  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-­‐03/31/c_13806851.htm	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defence system. In this system, land territorial defence was obviously being attended 
more than coastal area. Mao’s concept, which also called Maoist Triad, is a strategy to 
gradually beat the enemy by defence in depth. Essentially, this concept is carried out in 
defensive, stalemate and offensive operation.22 
According to Mao Zedong, human power, in a greater extent, is more powerful 
than weapon. Therefore, the fundamental concept in People's War is how to maintain 
the support from the population and to draw the enemy fall into the interior where the 
population will destroy them. People's war aims to deter any attacks, to survive from 
any offensives, and to destroy the aggressors. However, we may say that Mao Zedong 
emphasized land defence rather than air and maritime defence due to less sophisticated 
weaponry at that time. 
 
2.1.2 People’s War under Modernization by Den Xiaoping (1980s) 
In 1980s, People's War doctrine was revised to be People's War under Modern 
Condition, developed by Den Xiaoping. The concept is different from People's War by 
Mao Zedong as it moved away from reliance on troops over technology. 
There are 4 (four) main things that were laid in Den Xiaoping's doctrine23: 
1. Human or population power and weaponry are both essential to deal with 
warfare in the future.  
2. To change perspective about war as an unlimited or inevitable thing to be 
avoidable one or postponed-able. This leads to an understanding that war can 
be used as deterrence strategy to any countries aiming to attack China. 
3. To change the strategy of letting enemy go further into interior. This is a 
strategy of deterring enemy from going into the territory. 
4. The importance of China's military defence. Beside human power, the 
sophistication of weaponry will also determine its success in a war. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  	   Rizal	  Sukma,	  Pemikiran	  Strategis	  China:	  Dari	  Mao	  Zedong	  ke	  Deng	  Xiaoping,	   Jakarta,	  CSIS,	  1995,	  p.	  
69.	  
23	  	   George	   Tan	   En	   Bok,	   “Strategic	   Doctrine”,	   in	   Program	   Peningkatan	   Kemampuan	   Militer	   Republik	  
Rakyat	  China	  (RRC)	  accessed	  from	  www.library.upnv.ac.id	  on	  18	  June	  2012.	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2.1.3  Limited-War under High-Tech Condition (1992) 
In the beginning of 1990s, China's strategic defence was revised once again and the 
then development was emphasized more on naval power. China's military operation was 
also emphasized more on the use of high sophisticated weaponry. Military power on air, 
ocean, and land were developed to have rapid response capability in order to deal with 
regional war or low intensify conflicts around China. 
When Jiang Zemin took office in 1992, China's defence modernization was more 
developed with the doctrine of Limited War under High-Tech Condition. This doctrine 
was aimed at preparing China to face the possibility of limited war in the future which 
tent to be a choice in solving problems instead of confronting unlimited war. This 
doctrine emphasizes the importance of the role of high technology in facing the future 
war.24 The modernization aims to develop People Liberation Army, which is small in 
number but big in knowledge and high technology. 
 
2.2  China’s Current Defence Policy 
Essentially, the Chinese government pursues a national defence policy that is defensive 
in nature. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the National 
Defence Law of the PRC, which is enacted in accordance with the Constitution, 
specifies the tasks of the Chinese armed Forces. This is to mention their role to 
consolidate national defence, resist aggression, defend the motherland, safeguard the 
people's peaceful labor, participate in national construction and serve the people 
wholeheartedly. China has always attached primary importance to safeguarding state 
sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security, and has been working hard for a 
peaceful international and a favorable peripheral environment for China's socialist 
modernization drive.  
In details, the recent China's defence policy as mentioned in its 2000 National 
White Paper has the following main aspects25: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	   Weixing	  Hu,	  “China's	  Security	  Strategy	   in	  A	  Changing	  World”	   in	  Program	  Peningkatan	  Kemampuan	  
Militer	  Republik	  Rakyat	  China	  (RRC)	  accessed	  from	  www.library.upnv.ac.id	  on	  18	  June	  2012.	  	  
25	  	   China's	   National	   Defense	   in	   2000	   (2000)	   accessed	   from	   http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-­‐
07/27/content_17524.htm	  on	  16	  June	  2012.	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1. Consolidating national defence, resisting aggression, curbing armed subversion, 
and defending state sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security. China's 
efforts in defence modernization are purely for self-defence. China spares no effort 
to avoid and curb war, as well as to solve international disputes and questions left 
over by history through peaceful means. However, in view of the fact that hegemon 
and power politics still exist and are further developing, and in particular, the basis 
for the country's peaceful reunification is seriously imperiled, China will have to 
enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means. 
2. Building and consolidating national defence independently and through self-
reliance. China stresses self-reliance as the basis for safeguarding state security, 
and insists on making national defene policies and development strategies 
independently. China does not seek alliance with any country or bloc of countries, 
nor does it participate in any military bloc. China builds its defence science, 
technology and industry and develops its weaponry through self-reliance. 
3. Implementing the military strategy of active defence. Strategically, China pursues a 
principle featuring defensive operations, self-defence and gaining mastery by 
striking only after the enemy has struck. Such defence strategy combines efforts to 
deter war with preparations, to win self-defence wars in time of peace, and strategic 
defence with operational and tactical offensive operations in time of war. While 
basing themselves on existing weaponry and carrying forward their fine traditions, 
China's armed forces seek to adapt to profound changes in the world's military 
sphere, and prepare for defensive operations under modern, especially high-tech 
conditions. 
4. Building a lean and strong military force in the Chinese way. In line with the 
general requirements of being qualified politically, competent militarily, and 
having a fine work style, a strong sense of discipline and adequate logistical 
support, the Chinese armed forces strive to strengthen their overall development 
and form a revolutionized, modernized and regularized people's army with Chinese 
characteristics. China adheres to building the armed forces by enhancing their 
quality, strengthening the armed forces by relying on science and technology, and 
managing the armed forces according to law, and is endeavoring to transform its 
armed forces from a numerically superior to a qualitatively superior type, and from 
	  
	  
12	  
a manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive type, as well as to train high-
quality military personnel and improve the modernization level of weaponry in 
order to comprehensively enhance the armed forces' combat effectiveness. 
5. Combining the armed forces with the people and practicing self-defence by the 
whole people. China adheres to the concept of people's war under modern 
conditions, and exercises the combination of a streamlined standing army with a 
powerful reserve force for national defence. The reserve force and militia are 
maintained at an appropriate scale, with an optimized structure and an enhanced 
level of training. In the light of the principle of combining peacetime footing with 
wartime footing and the army with the people, and having reserve soldiers among 
the people, China works hard to popularize and promote defence education, perfect 
the defense mobilization system and enhance the defence mobilization capacity. 
6. Subordinating national defence to, and placing it in the service of, the nation's 
overall economic construction, and achieving their coordinated development. 
Developing the economy and strengthening national defence are two strategic tasks 
in China's modernization efforts. The Chinese government insists that economic 
development be taken as the center, while defence work be subordinate to and in 
the service of the nation's overall economic construction. Meanwhile, along with 
economic development, the state strives to enhance its national defence strength, to 
effectively support the armed forces in their efforts to improve their quality and to 
form a mechanism which enables national defence and economic development to 
promote each other and develop in harmony. 
7. Safeguarding world peace, and opposing aggression and expansion. China 
resolutely opposes hegemonism and power politics, and combats the policies of 
war, aggression and expansion. China also objects to any country imposing in any 
form its own political system and ideology on other countries. China does not seek 
military expansion, nor does it station troops or set up military bases in any foreign 
country. China opposes arms race, and supports the international community, in its 
efforts to promote world and regional peace, security and stability. 
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Furthermore, in China’s White Paper 2002, Chinese government added its 
national defence policy with two important things26: 
• To accelerate national defence development and achieve national defence and 
military modernization. China follows an approach of coordinating national 
defence building and economic development, striving for a high cost-
effectiveness and promoting defence and military modernization on the basis of 
economic growth. Taking Mao Zedong's military thinking and Deng Xiaoping's 
thinking on armed forces building in the new period as the guide to action, and 
fully implementing the important thought of the "Three Represents," the Chinese 
military persists in taking the road of fewer but better troops with Chinese 
characteristics, pushes forward the various reforms in response to the trend in 
military changes in the world, and strives to accomplish the historical tasks of 
mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development 
in the modernization of the military. 
• To stop separation and realize complete unification of the motherland. China 
possesses a small number of nuclear weapons entirely for self-defence. China 
undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. China does not 
participate in any nuclear arms race, and never deploys any nuclear weapons 
beyond its borders. China maintains a small but effective nuclear counterattacking 
force in order to deter possible nuclear attacks by other countries. Any such attack 
will inevitably result in a retaliatory nuclear counterstrike by China. China has 
always kept the number of its nuclear weapons at a low level. The scale, 
composition and development of China's nuclear force are in line with China's 
military strategy of active defense. China's nuclear force is under the direct 
command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China is extremely 
cautious and responsible in the management of its nuclear weapons, and has 
established strict rules and regulations and taken effective measures to ensure the 
safety and security of its nuclear weapons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  	   China's	  National	  Defence	  in	  2002	  (2002),	  December	  2002,	  accessed	  from	  Chinese	  Government's	  
Official	  Web	  Portal	  http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-­‐07/28/content_17780.htm	  on	  19	  June	  2012	  
at	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Although China carries out a peaceful development policy, settlement of the 
Taiwan issue and realization of the complete reunification of China embodies the 
fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. As mentioned in its 2000 National Defence 
White Paper, the Chinese government upholds the basic principle of "peaceful 
reunification, and one country, two systems" for settling the Taiwan issue, carrying 
forward the eight propositions on the development of relations between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Straits and the promotion of the peaceful reunification of China. The 
Chinese government has consistently adhered to the one-China principle and will never 
give in or compromise on the fundamental issues concerning state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.  
This means that the change of Taiwan regional leaders cannot change the fact that 
Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. Chinese government confirms that the settlement 
of the Taiwan issue is entirely an internal affair of China. The Chinese government 
firmly opposes any country selling arms to Taiwan, or entering into military alliances in 
any form with Taiwan, as well as outside interference in any way. The Chinese 
government will do its utmost to achieve peaceful reunification, and advocates settling 
differences through dialogues and negotiations on the basis of the one-China principle.  
However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan 
from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or 
if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross-Straits 
reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will have no choice 
but to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard 
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and achieve the great cause of 
reunification. The "Taiwan independence" means provoking war again, and fomenting 
splits means relinquishing peace across the Straits. The Chinese People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) unswervingly takes the will of the state as its supreme will and the 
national interests as its supreme interests. It has the absolute determination, confidence, 
ability and means to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and will never 
tolerate, condone or remain indifferent to the realization of any scheme to divide the 
motherland.27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  	   China's	  National	  Defence	  in	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Some additional for China’s Defence Strategy is also found in China’s White 
Paper 2004. They are: 
• To take the road of composite and leapfrog development. Going with the tide of the 
world's military development and moving along the direction of 
informationalization in the process of modernization, the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) shall gradually achieve the transition from mechanization and semi-
mechanization to informationalization. Based on China's national conditions and 
the PLA's own conditions, the PLA persists in taking mechanization as the 
foundation to promote informationalization, and informationalization as the driving 
force to bring forward mechanization. The PLA will promote coordinated 
development of firepower, mobility and information capability, enhance the 
development of its operational strength with priority given to the Navy, Air Force 
and Second Artillery Force, and strengthen its comprehensive deterrence and war 
fighting capabilities. 
• To build a strong military by means of science and technology. The PLA works to 
improve its combat capabilities by taking advantage of scientific and technological 
advances and aims at building qualitative efficiency instead of a mere quantitative 
scale, and transforming the military from a manpower-intensive one to a 
technology-intensive one. Implementing the Strategic Project for Talented People, 
the PLA focuses on training a new type of high-caliber military personnel. It works 
to build up a complete system of weaponry and equipment by stepping up 
development of new- and high-tech weaponry and equipment while upgrading 
those in active service. In an innovative spirit, the PLA endeavors to improve its 
training system as well as the means and methods of training so as to raise its 
military training to a higher level. Relying on national economic, scientific and 
technological development, the PLA is devoted to improving the level of scientific 
management and achieving a higher overall cost-effectiveness in military 
expenditure so as to modernize the armed forces with less input and better results. 
• To deepen the reform of the armed forces. Based on the transformation of modern 
warfare and the requirements of the socialist market economy, the PLA seeks to 
achieve development and breakthroughs in the process of reform and innovation. 
The PLA develops its military theories in an innovative spirit, and explores the 
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laws of building the army and conducting operations under the condition of 
informationalization. In accordance with the principle of making the troops smaller 
and better, as well as more integrated and efficient, and with emphasis on adjusting 
the organizational structure and reforming the command system, the PLA works to 
build and further improve the military structure and organization to make them 
appropriate in size, optimal in structure, streamlined in institutional set-up and 
flexible and swift in command. The PLA also works to readjust and regulate the 
relationship within the military as well as that with the government and society so 
as to put in place policies and mechanisms, which will help motivate officers and 
soldiers. 
• To step up preparations for military struggle. The PLA takes as its objective to win 
local wars under the conditions of informationalization and gives priority to 
developing weaponry and equipment, to building joint operational capabilities, and 
to making full preparations in the battlefields. Meanwhile, it adheres to the people's 
war concept and develops the strategies and tactics of the people's war. To meet the 
requirements of integrated and joint operations, the PLA endeavors to establish a 
modern operational system capable of giving full play to the overall efficiency of 
the armed forces as well as the national war potentials. The PLA conducts more 
training and exercises with specific objectives in order to raise its capabilities in 
coping with various crises and contingencies. 
• To carry out military exchanges and cooperation. In line with the national foreign 
policy, the PLA conducts military cooperation that is non-aligned, non-
confrontational and not directed against any third party. The PLA takes part in the 
UN peacekeeping operations and international counter-terrorism cooperation. 
While promoting military exchanges in various forms, the PLA works to establish 
security dialogue mechanisms in order to create a military security environment 
featuring mutual trust and mutual benefit. It takes part in bilateral or multilateral 
joint military exercises in non-traditional security fields so as to enhance the joint 
capabilities to cope with threats in those fields. The PLA learns from and draws on 
the valuable experience of foreign armed forces, and introduces, on a selective 
basis, technologically advanced equipment and better management expertise from 
abroad to advance the modernization of the Chinese armed forces. 
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2.2.1  China’s Military Expenditure 
China's defence expenditure falls into the following categories: personnel expenses, 
costs for maintenance of activities, and costs for equipment. Personnel expenses mainly 
cover the salaries, allowances, food and clothing of officers, non-ranking cadres, 
enlisted men and civilian employees. Costs for maintenance of activities mainly cover 
training, construction and maintenance of facilities and running expenses. Costs for 
equipment mainly cover research, experimentation, procurement, maintenance, 
transportation and storage. China's defence expenditure covers not only the active 
forces, but also the militia and reserve forces. Support for some retired officers, the 
education of the children of military personnel, and other social spending are also 
provided by the defence expenditure. 
China’s defence expenditure grows higher year by year due to its good economic 
condition. The graphic below shows the Gross Domestic Product of China yearly from 
2000 to 2011 
Table 1. : Graphic of China’s GDP 2000-2011 
 
Source: http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/html-jsp/viewNewReport.jsp? Accessed on 16 June 2012 on 8 
pm	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Table 2. : China’s Military Expenditure 
 
Year 
MILITARY 
EXPENDITURE BY CHINA 
IN 
MILITARY 
EXPENDITURE BY CHINA AS 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Bill. Yuan Bill.US$  
2000 184 33496 1.9 
2001 227 41176 2.1 
2002 262 47829 2.2 
2003 288 51955 2.1 
2004 331 57542 2.1 
2005 379 64726 2.0 
2006 452 76065 2.0 
2007 546 87730 2.1 
2008 638 96663 2.0 
2009 764 116666 2.2 
2010 820 121064 2.1 
2011 923 129272 2.2 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database © SIPRI 2012 accessed from  
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/sources_methods on 20 June 2012 at 10 pm 
 
In its 2002 White Defence Paper, China said that the increased defence 
expenditure in recent years has primarily been for the following purposes28:  
1. Increase of personnel expenses. Along with the socio-economic development 
and the per-capita income rise of rural and urban residents, it is necessary to 
improve the living standards and conditions of military personnel. The past 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  	   China's	  National	  Defence	  in	  2002	  (2002),	  op.cit.	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decade has witnessed the increase of the board expenses in the armed forces on 
five occasions, and an 84% salary raise for officers and 92% allowance raise for 
soldiers.  
2. Establishment and gradual improvement of a social security system for 
servicemen. In accordance with the requirements of the market economy, China 
has, since 1998, established such systems as injury and death insurance for 
servicemen, medical insurance for demobilized servicemen and housing 
subsidies for servicemen, and adjusted and enhanced living expense standards 
for PLA retirees.  
3. Increase of expenses of a maintenance nature. Since the armed forces stopped 
commercial activities in 1998, the budget for training has increased year by year. 
With the gradual improvement of living facilities and progressive office 
automation, expenses of a maintenance nature have kept rising.  
4. Increase of expenses spent on cooperation with the international community in 
anti-terrorism activities.  
5. Appropriate increase of expenses for the improvement of military equipment to 
enhance defence capabilities under the conditions of modern technologies, 
particularly high technologies. 
 
While in 2004, the increased part of China's defence expenditure has primarily 
been used for the following purposes29:  
1. Increase of the salaries and allowances of the military personnel. It is necessary 
to raise the salaries and allowances of the military personnel in associated with 
the socio-economic development and the per-capita income rise of urban and 
rural residents. In the light of the unified wage adjustment policy for the 
personnel of state organs, China has raised the salary rates of officers, civil 
cadres and non-commissioned officers; the allowances of conscripts and cadets 
under the supply system; and the pensions of the retired.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  	   China's	  National	  Defence	  in	  2004	  (2004),	  December	  2004,	  accessed	  from	  Chinese	  Government's	  
Official	  Web	  Portal	  http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-­‐07/28/content_18078.htm	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2. Further improvement of the social insurance system for servicemen. In 
December 2003, the Provisional Measures on Social Insurance for Unemployed 
Accompanying Spouses of PLA Servicemen was formulated, to guarantee their 
basic living standard and provide them with social insurance subsidies.  
3. Support for the structural and organizational reform of the military. China once 
again downsizes its military by 200,000, and has to increase the expenses on the 
resettlement of the discharged surplus personnel accordingly.  
4. Increased investment in the development of high-caliber talents in the military. 
The PLA has established and refined an incentive mechanism for talented 
people, improved conditions in military educational institutions, and entrusted 
non-military colleges and universities with the education of qualified personnel, 
so as to ensure the achievement of the PLA's Strategic Project for Talented 
People.  
5. Moderate increase of equipment expenses. This is aimed at promoting the 
leapfrog development of weaponry and equipment, and stepping up preparations 
for military struggle. 
 
Recently, in 2010, the increase in China's defence expenditure has primarily been 
used for the following purposes30:  
1. Improving support conditions for the troops: Along with the economic and 
social development and the improvement of people's living standards, the PLA 
has adjusted servicemen's salaries and allowances, increased funding for 
education and training, water and electricity supplies and heating, upgraded 
logistics support for grass-roots units in a comprehensive and coordinated way, 
and improved the on-duty, training and living conditions of border and coastal 
defense forces and units in remote areas and harsh environments.  
2. Accomplishing diversified military tasks: China has increased investment in 
improving MOOTW (Military Operation Other Than War) capabilities, in 
supporting earthquake rescue and disaster relief operations, in escort operations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  	   China's	  National	  Defence	  in	  2010,	  March	  2011,	  accessed	  from	  Chinese	  Government's	  Official	  Web	  
Portal	  http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-­‐03/31/content_1835499_4.htm	  on	  21	  June	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in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia, in flood control and emergency 
rescue operations, and in international rescue operations.  
3. Pushing forward the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese 
characteristics. In view of the upward trend in purchasing prices and 
maintenance costs, China has moderately increased the funds for high-tech 
weaponry and equipment and their supporting facilities. 
 
2.2.2  China’s Military Personnel31 
The armed forces of the PRC are composed of the PLA both the active and reserve 
components, the Chinese People's Armed Police Force and the militia. The active 
components of the PLA are the country's standing army, which mainly undertake the 
task of defensive military operations, and help to maintain social order, if necessary, in 
accordance with the law. 
The PLA is composed of three services - the Army, Navy and Air Force - and an 
independent arm, the Second Artillery Force. The Army has such arms as the infantry, 
artillery, armor, engineering, communications, anti-chemical warfare and Army 
aviation, as well as other specialized units. The Navy has such arms as the surface, 
submarine, naval aviation, coastal defence and marine corps as well as other specialized 
units. The Air Force has such arms as the aviation, surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft 
artillery, radar, and airborne, as well as other specialized units. The Second Artillery 
Force is composed of the strategic missile, conventional missile, and other specialized 
units. 
It has been the established policy to build a streamlined military with Chinese 
characteristics. Since the mid-1980s, China has twice downsized its military by a total 
of 1.5 million. In September 2003, the Chinese government decided to further reduce 
200,000 troops by the end of 2005 to maintain the size of the PLA at 2.3 million. The 
current restructuring, while cutting down the numbers, aims at optimal force structures, 
smoother internal relations and better quality. 
Rebalancing the ratio between officers and men. By streamlining structure, 
reducing the number of officers in deputy positions, filling officers' posts with non-
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commissioned officers (NCOs) and adopting a system of civilian employees, the 
number of the PLA officers can be substantially reduced to optimize the ratio between 
officers and men. 
Improving the system of leadership and command. The emphasis is put on 
streamlining the staff offices and the directly affiliated organs at the corps level and 
above, so as to compress the command chains and further improve the operational 
command system to strengthen the command functions. The numbers of offices and 
personnel are both reduced by about 15% by adjusting staff functions, dismantling and 
merging offices and reducing the numbers of subordinate offices and assigned 
personnel. 
Optimizing the composition of the services and arms of the PLA. The Army is 
streamlined by reducing the ordinary troops that are technologically backward while the 
Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force are strengthened. The make-up of troops 
and the size of the services and arms are optimized with an increasing proportion of 
new- and high-tech units. 
Deepening the reform of joint logistical support. The PLA continues to adopt the 
system of joint logistical support at military area commands. The scope of joint 
logistical support is further enlarged and the number of logistical organizations and 
personnel are reduced while the rear hospitals, recuperation centers and general-purpose 
warehouses formerly under the administration of the services and arms are all integrated 
and reorganized into the joint logistical support system. An integrated tri-service joint 
logistical support system gradually takes shape, thus improving the overall efficiency. 
Realigning the organizational structure of military educational institutions. The 
PLA aims at improving the structure and system for educating military personnel in 
both military and civilian educational institutions, and speeding up the establishment 
and improvement of a new educational system. This new system focuses on pre-
assignment education, which is separated from education for academic credentials. In 
accordance with the requirements for running educational institutions intensively on a 
proper scale, the PLA has optimized the system and structure of educational institutions 
by cutting down on those that are not essentially different from their civilian 
counterparts, and those that are more than necessary, and merging those that are co-
located or have similar tasks. 
	  
	  
23	  
2.2.3 China’s Military Equipment32 
A.  Ballistic and Cruise Missiles  
China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world.  
It is developing and testing several new cl asses and variants of offensive missiles, 
forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading certain missile systems, and 
developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. The PLA is acquiring large 
numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically-produced ground-
launched DH-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM); the domestically produced 
ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), which is outfitted 
on the domestically produced LUYANG II-class guided-missile destroyer (DDGs); the 
Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is outfitted on China’s 
SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs acquired from Russia; and, the Russian SS-N-
27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM, which is outfitted on China’s Russian-built, KILO-
class diesel electric submarines. 
By December 2009, the PLA had deployed between 1,050 and 1,150 CSS-6 and 
CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to units opposite Taiwan. It is upgrading 
the lethality of this force, including by introducing variants of these missiles with 
improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads. China is developing an anti-ship ballistic 
missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile 
(MRBM).  The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a 
maneuverable warhead, and when integrated with appropriate command and control 
systems, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft 
carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.  
  China is modernizing its nuclear forces by adding more survivable delivery 
systems.  For example, in recent years the road mobile, solid propellant DF-31 and DF-
31A intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBM) have entered service.  The DF-
31A, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the 
continental United States (CONUS). China may also be developing a new road-mobile 
ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles 
(MIRV).  
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B.  Naval Forces    
The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and 
amphibious warfare ships in Asia.  China’s naval forces include some 75 principal 
combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and 
roughly 85 missile-equipped patrol craft. Construction of a new PLA Navy base on 
Hainan Island is essentially complete.  The base is large enough to accommodate a mix 
of attack and ballistic missile submarines and advanced surface combatants.  The base, 
which has underground facilities, provides the PLA Navy with direct access to vital 
international sea-lanes and offers the potential for stealthy deployment of submarines 
into the South China Sea.  
The PLA Navy has also reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 pilots 
to operate fixed-wing aircraft from an aircraft carrier.  The initial program, presumably 
land-based, would be followed in about four years by ship-borne training involving the 
ex-VARYAG—a former Soviet Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier—which was purchased 
by China from Ukraine in 1998 and is being renovated at a shipyard in Dalian, China. 
The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with Sky 
Wave and Surface Wave OTH radars. OTH radars could be used in conjunction with 
imagery satellites to assist in locating targets at great distances from PRC shores to 
support long-range precision strikes, including by anti-ship ballistic missiles. 
In addition, China has an active aircraft carrier which is aimed for research and 
development program. The PRC shipbuilding industry could start construction of an 
indigenous platform by the end of this year.  China is interested in building multiple 
operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the next decade. China continues 
production of its newest JIN-class (Type 094) nuclear powered ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN).  China may field up to five new SSBNs.  One JIN-class SSBN has 
entered service alongside two new SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered attack 
submarines (SSN), four older HAN-class SSNs, and China’s single XIA-class SSBN. 
China is further expanding its current force of nuclear-powered attack submarines and 
may add up to five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the inventory in the coming years.  
China has 13 SONG-class (Type 039) diesel-electric attack submarines (SS) in its 
inventory. The SONG- class SS is designed to carry the YJ-82 ASCM.  The follow-on 
to the SONG is the YUAN-class SS, as many as four of which are already in service. 
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China may plan to construct 15 additional hulls for this class.  The YUAN-class SS are 
armed similarly to the SONG-class SS, but also include a possible air independent 
propulsion system.  The SONG SS, YUAN SS, and SHANG SSN will be capable of 
launching the new CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile completes development and 
testing.  
The PLA Navy continues its acquisition of domestically produced surface 
combatants. These include two LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) DDGs fitted with the 
indigenous HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM); two LUZHOU-class (Type 
051C) DDGs equipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long-range SAM; and f our (soon to 
be six) JIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) guided-missile frigates (FFG) to be fitted with 
the medium-range HHQ-16 vertically launched naval SAM currently under 
development. These ships reflect the leadership’s priority on an advanced anti-air 
warfare capability for China’s naval forces, which has historically been a  weakness of 
the fleet. China has deployed some 60 of its new HOUBEI-class (Type 022) wave-
piercing catamaran hull missile patrol boats.  Each boat can carry up to eight YJ-83 
ASCMs.  
 
C.  Air Defence Forces 
China has based 490 combat aircrafts within unrefueled operational range of Taiwan 
and also had the airfield capacity to expand that number by hundreds. Many of these 
aircraft are upgrades of older models. However, newer and more advanced aircraft 
make up a growing percentage of the inventory.    
China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted from the Russian Tu-
16) with a new variant that, when operational, will be armed with a new long-range 
cruise missile. The PLAAF has continued to expand its inventory of long-range, 
advanced SAM systems and now possesses one of the largest such forces in the world.  
Over the past five years, China’s efforts have included the acquisition of a number of 
SA-20 PMU2 battalions, the most advanced SAM system offered for export by Russia, 
and the introduction of the indigenously designed HQ-9. China’s aviation industry is 
developing several types of airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.  
This includes the KJ-200, based on the Y-8 transport, for AEW&C as well as 
	  
	  
26	  
intelligence collection and maritime surveillance, and theKJ-2000, based on a modified 
IL-76 transport airframe.  
 
D.  Ground Forces. 
The PLA has about 1.25 million personnel in its ground forces, with roughly 400,000 
based in the three MRs opposite Taiwan.  China is upgrading ground forces units with 
modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery.  Among the new capabilities 
acquired by, or under development for, PLA ground forces are Type 99 third-generation 
main battle tanks, a new-generation amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), and 200-mm, 
300-mm, and 400-mm multiple rocket launch systems.  
In 2009, the PLA focused training and exercises on command and control, joint 
ground and air coordination, mobility and mobilization in information warfare, and 
assault operations. In addition to the active ground forces, China has a reserve force of 
some 500,000 (as of 2008) and a large militia that can be mobilized in wartime to 
support the war effort within their home provinces.  Although China plans to reduce the 
size of the organized militia from 10 million to 8 million by the end of the 11th Five 
Year Plan (2006-2010), all males between 18 and 35 years of age not currently serving 
in the military are technically part of the militia system.    
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Chapter 3 
Japan’s Strategy to Respond China 
 
3.1 Japan’s Threat Perception 
This part particularly elaborates Japan’s perception on China’s military strategy. Japan 
particularly enunciates its view regarding the security situation in Asia Pacific in 
general, in her 2011 White Defence Paper. In this paper, Japan perceives the region as 
considerably dynamic in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity. Yet, the 
conflicts between countries and region remained existed in the region. This also 
appoints to the territorial claims and reunification issue that continue to plague the Asia 
Pacific region after Cold War. 
Japanese government revealed her threat perception by firstly stating its concern 
over North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missiles issues. The concern was intensified by 
the situation in November 2010 when North Korea revealed uranium enrichment 
program to a visiting US expert. North Korea further stated that the program, equipped 
with thousands of centrifuges, has been in operation. This indicates the possibility of 
nuclear development by North Korea since the previous two announcements of nuclear 
tests in October 2006 and May 2009.  
According to Japan, North Korea has made significant advancements in its 
nuclear plan. North Korea has also enhanced its ballistic missile capability. By carrying 
out this program North Korea obviously poses a significant threat for Japan as well as 
the peace and stability in Asia Pacific and the international community. North Korea 
has also repeatedly carried out military provocations, in the case of artillery firing at 
Yeonpyeong Island (South Korea) in November 2010. 33 
In its 2011 White Paper, Japan also clearly mentions Russia as its concern. Under 
President Medvedev, Russia is pursuing its national interests to be a country with global 
influence. Thus, Russia is now developing its military posture in line with its resources 
against the backdrop of its economic development. This is to mention Russian’s 
strategy to downsize its troops, reform its organizational aspects, rebuild its readiness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  	   Security	  Environment	  Surrounding	  Japan	  in	  Defense	  of	  Japan	  2011	  (White	  Defence	  Paper)	  page.26	  -­‐	  
27	  accessed	  from	  www.mod.go.jp	  	  
	  
	  
28	  
postures, and modernize its military personnel including the development of new 
equipment. Recently, Russia has also deployed its navy and air forces in joint military 
training coupled with its strategic bombers. In the Far East, Russia continues to operate 
its vessels and aircrafts as well as large-scale exercises.34 
 
3.2 Japan’s Perception on China 
Although North Korea and Russia have become a concern, China currently poses the 
biggest threat for Japan. In its White Defense Paper, like in 2005 – 2011, Japan has 
always revealed potential threats that might come from China. In Japan’s observation, 
China has come to a considerably economic development, which has affected its 
military power. This confirms that China has opportunities, potentials and capabilities 
to advance its military modernization. 
As far as Japan is concerned, China reduces the quantity of its PLA personnel, 
mainly in army. Yet Chinese government approved to increase the quality of its military 
equipment, particularly naval and air forces, as well as nuclear and missile capabilities. 
Moreover, China is improving its joint operational capabilities, namely to conduct 
practical exercises, to cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for 
administering operations as well as to improve the domestic defence industry. Many of 
PLA’s equipment are still outdated, thus the current military modernization efforts is to 
improve its capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not show a clear, specific future 
vision of its military modernization. For Japan, there is a concern regarding how 
China’s military power will impact the regional situation and its security, which is to be 
carefully analyzed. 
Ultimately, Japan worries about the lack of transparency over the rising China’s 
defence budget and its military procurement. PLA operations nearby Japan’s territory 
also intensify its concerns. Japan's White Defence Paper in 2009, 2010, and 2011 
perceived that China has not disclosed specific information on its possession of 
weapons, procurement goals or past procurements. This is in addition to the volatility of 
PLA’s organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations 
and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of China national defence budget. 
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China has released its defence white papers every two years since 1998 and 
conducts dialogues with other government. However, China has not yet achieved the 
levels of transparency as expected by many countries in the international society. For 
example, as for a detailed breakdown of national defence spending, China announced 
only the total amount and general purposes of the three categories: personnel, training 
and maintenance, and equipment. Moreover, the report for the United Nations 
Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2009 was not 
completed in accordance with the standard format used by Japan and many other 
nations, whereby a detailed breakdown of military expenditure is required. The 
information was almost as simple as that provided in China's defence white papers 
without further details.35 
Japan states that the amount of the defence budget announced by China is 
considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures. It is believed that the 
announced defence budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs as well 
as research and development expenses. With the lack of transparency over its military 
policy, China’s procurement of weapons and its activities have obviously intensified 
Japan’s concerns.  
According to Japan’s observation about China in White Defense Paper 2009 – 
2011, The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 1,980 combat aircrafts in 
total. The number of fourth-generation modern fighters is rising steadily. Japan believes 
that China is domestically mass-producing J-10 fighters and carrying out import and 
licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-
surface and anti-ship attack capabilities from Russia.  China is believed to import highly 
sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missiles from Russia in order to improve air 
defence capabilities. 36 China has also begun to enhance the electronic warfare and 
intelligence capabilities for its aircraft in addition to increased actual reconnaissance 
flights against surrounding countries. In September 2007, H-6 medium-range bombers 
flew into Japanese air defence identification zone over the East China Sea to advance 
nearby the Japan-China median line. 37 
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Of the biggest concerns over China is the possession of nuclear weapons. China 
owns various types and ranges of ballistic missiles such as intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles  (SLBM), intermediate range 
ballistic missiles/medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBM). 38 The survivability and readiness of China’s ballistic missile 
forces are under improvement by updating liquid propellant type to a solid propellant 
one. Moreover, Japan also believed that China is increasing performance by extending 
ranges, improving precision, introducing MIRV and other means.  
China possesses approximately 30 ICBMs as a strategic nuclear force. The 
majority of which have been fixed-type missiles with liquid fuel propellant systems.  In 
general, this type of missile requires time to inject liquid fuel immediately before 
launching, and thus signs of a launch can be detected beforehand and may invite a 
preemptive attack.  For this reason, Japan believed, China has developed the DF31, 
which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid fuel propellant system mounted onto a 
transporter erector launcher  (TEL), and the DF-31A, an extended model of the DF-31, 
which appears to have already been deployed. Regarding SLBMs, the country currently 
appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM with a range of approximately 
8,000km, and constructing Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines  
(SSBN) to carry the missiles. Now that the DF-31 and the DF-31A have been deployed, 
once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, Japan believes more that China’s strategic 
nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.39 
As for the IBRM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China 
has deployed liquid-fuel-propellant DF-3 and  DF-4  missiles. China also deploys the 
DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These missiles are capable of 
carrying nuclear warheads.  It is believed that China is currently developing 
conventional-warhead anti-ship ballistic missiles based on the DF-21, which could be 
used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers. China is also believed to be 
developing the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 1,500km or longer.  Once 
available for actual operation, those missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, 
covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. In addition to IBRM/MRBM, China 
also possesses a 100 plus dozens of H-6 (Tu-16) medium-range bombers that are 
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capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Concerning short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBM), China possesses a large number of DF-15 and DF-11, and they are likely to 
have been deployed against Taiwan.40 
In the meantime, Japan also observed China’s ground forces as the largest in the 
world with approximately 1,6 million personnel. In 2009 China carried out "Stride 209" 
exercise, which traversed across military regions and were deemed its largest ever 
exercises of this type, and it also carried out similar "Mission Action 2010" exercises in 
2010. These exercises are believed by Japan to have been designed to verify and 
improve capabilities necessary for deploying army units to distant areas, such as the 
army's long-range maneuvering capabilities and logistical support capabilities, 
including the mobilization of militia and public transportation.41 
The naval forces consist of three fleets-the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea 
Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 950 ships, including approximately 50 
submarines, with a total displacement of approximately 1,34 million tons.  The Chinese 
Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively 
constructing new types of domestic submarines to enhance its submarine force. 
Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense 
and anti-ship missile capabilities, and is increasing and improving landing ships and 
supply ships.42 
Japan also noticed that China continues to put forth efforts for space 
development. China has launched various satellites into space using indigenously 
produced rockets, successfully conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar 
orbiter.  In September 2008, China launched the Shenzhou-7 manned spaceship and its 
astronaut successfully performed China’s first extravehicular activities. As it appears 
that in China’s space development military and non-military uses laser beams to hamper 
satellite functions. Japan has opinion that China is having interest in cyber warfare and 
they are believed to have organized and be currently training a cyber-warfare-
specialized unit.43 
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Japan recognizes that China’s interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare 
can be attributed to the increasing reliance of information gathering and command as 
well as communication in military sector. These are vital for swift and efficient exercise 
of military strength, on satellites and computer networks. 
China’s military operation obviously leads Japan to insecurity. In her White 
Defence Paper 2005 – 2011, Japan revealed some of its objections towards China’s 
military operation around Japan’s territory.  In November 2004, for example, Chinese 
nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial water. This can be seen as 
a breach of international law. In addition, Chinese naval vessels have been observed 
conducting exercises and information gathering activities in the waters. Other naval 
vessels as well as Chinese government ships have also been observed engaging in 
apparent oceanographic research within the exclusive economic zone of Japan.  
Furthermore, as stated in the White Defense Papers, in September 2005, Maritime 
Self-Defence Force P-3C patrol aircraft observed that a total of five Chinese naval 
vessels, including one Soveremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas 
field  (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in East China Sea and some of them (a total of three 
vessels including the Soveremenny-class destroyer) circled around the said gas field. In 
October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. 
aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters reportedly near Okinawa.44 
In October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels, including a Soveremenny-class 
destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait to advance to the Pacific Ocean. This was 
the first identified passage by Chinese surface combatants through the strait. These 
ships traveled southward in the Pacific and sailed between Okinawa Island and Miyako 
Island to take a route circling Japan. In November 2008, four naval vessels, including a 
top-of-the-line Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako 
Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean.  While in December 2008, two Chinese 
maritime research ships conducted navigation operations not permitted to foreign ships 
under international law such as hovering and cruising within the territorial waters of 
Japan near the Senkaku Islands. 45 
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In addition to activities at waters near Japan, China is enhancing its activities in 
the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, over which it is engaged in territorial disputes 
with neighbors, including some ASEAN countries. In November 2008, a flotilla of 
vessels consisting of a Luyang II-class destroyer, a Yuzhao-class amphibious ship and 
other vessels reportedly exercised in waters near the Spratly Islands. In March 2009, 
Chinese ships including a naval intelligence collection vessel, a Bureau of Maritime 
Fisheries patrol ship, and trawlers approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship 
operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. Other incidents also 
occurred in the same month.46 
From all the PLA’s maritime activities, Japan believes that China has some 
objectives by doing so. Japan breaks the detail of objectives down to four points, based 
on geographic location and economic globalization as well as the fact that China 
explicitly states in its laws and other means that its navy assumes the role of 
safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety47 : 
1. to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from the 
country in order to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this 
is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in 
science and technology. 
2. to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence.  
For example, China will not allow  any  foreign  intervention  in  solving  the 
Taiwan issue  and  realizing  the unification of China. If China aims to hold 
back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the 
sea, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea. 
3. to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests.  China is 
engaged in exploring and drilling oil and gas fields as well as building 
facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South 
China Sea. It is believed that the aims of the naval vessels operating near the 
drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005 included 
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the demonstration of their naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and 
protecting maritime rights and interests.  
4. to defend the sea-lanes of communications for China. The background of this 
is the fact that the sea-lanes of communications, including crude oil 
transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important lifelines 
for the increasingly globalizing Chinese economy. 
Japan also sees that in its military modernization, China appears to give particular 
priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities 
to prevent Taiwan’s independence and other efforts. However in recent years, China has 
begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. The 
military trends of China draw attention from countries in the region, as the country has 
been steadily growing as a major political and economic power in the region. 
Furthermore, Japanese government is concerned with the Sino-North Korea 
relationship. This is particularly appointing the support to North Korea’s regime from 
Chinese government.48 China has confirmed the strengthening of its military ties with 
North Korea, amid continuing tensions regarding the nuclear disarmament talks. China 
remains North Korean’s most important diplomatic ally and is a key source of food and 
fuel.49 Many observers perceive that Chinese government strongly supports North 
Korea, as China fears that the collapse of the North Korean regime could send many 
problems for this country. This is to mention a massive flow of desperate, starving 
refugees into northeastern China and lead to a pro-U.S. government setting up across its 
border.50  
The fact that Japan-China’s economic relations are strengthened is true. Yet, not 
their political and security relations.51 The memory of Japan’s invasion to China in 
World War II and their over territorial claims towards Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are still 
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affecting their relations. Thus, Japan views China’s effort to modernize its military 
power is an attempt that is not only aimed at dealing with non-traditional threats but 
also traditional threats. It can be used, firstly as a tool to expose its position in global 
politics. Secondly, it is used to force Taiwan with regards of its independence and 
eventually to repel Japan from Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, as it is written in Japan’s 
Defence White Paper 2010: 
“In its military modernization China appears to give particular 
priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the 
improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s 
independence and others, but in recent years, China has begun to 
work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan 
issue. The military trends of China draw attention from countries in 
the region, as the country has been steadily growing as a major 
political and economic power in the region.”52 
 
3.3 Japan’s Responses 
Japan has seen China’s arms build-up particularly in navy capabilities as a threat since 
they remain had East China Sea dispute to settle. Japan-China negotiation on the oil and 
gas deposits in this sea has not come to end yet. Therefore, the escalation activities of 
Chinese naval near the gas and oil field in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have led to 
Japan’s concern. Regarding this issue, a retired Lieutenant General and Corps 
Commander of Japan’s Northern Army, who later became a professor at Teikyo 
University, says, “We do not have any concern about their land forces, only maritime 
forces like the navy and missiles. A drastic expansion of that kind of capability could be 
a threat in the future.”53  
In response to China’s armed forces modernization and North Korea’s nuclear 
proliferation program, Japan has revised her defence strategy over the last decade. 
Japanese government arranged a New Defence Program Outlines (NDPO), starting 
from 2001. The strategy mainly prepares JSDF (Japan Self-Defence Forces) to support 
the US campaign war on terrorism in Afghanistan and United Nations Peace Keeping 
Operation. Yet, for the first time, after its security agreement with US in 1951, Japan 
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was approved its own power projection capabilities that made it procured UH-60JA 
multi role helicopters, Hawk surface-to-air missiles, landing ship tank for helicopters 
and destroyer-helicopter ships.54 
The above strategy certainly applied with a stronger cooperation with the United 
States (US) and an intention to play a greater role in both regional and global security. 
To support its global goals, Japan has also proposed “Dynamic Defence Force” 
strategy, which permits its Defence Minister to shift the land forces to mobile forces. 
Recently, Japan is acquiring six new submarines, equipped with two more warships 
with Aegis missile and building three additional ground-based missile defense units – 
systems.55 Not to mention, Japan is benefitted from its security agreement with US. The 
agreement allows the Japanese government to develop and deploy it missile defence 
systems, primarily with US technology. 
For Japan, in the Asia Pacific region, where China’s military power significantly 
increased coupled with the lack of transparency and elements of uncertainty remain 
existed, the presence of the US military is extremely important. This is vital to achieve 
regional stability. Japan and other countries have established bilateral alliances and 
friendly relations with the United States and, accordingly, they allow the stationing and 
deployment of U.S. forces in their territories. Some efforts are being made by Japan to 
engage in multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
ASEAN Defence Minister's Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and conferences hosted by 
non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, as 
well as bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. 
 
3.4 The US Involvement 
At the same time, in November 2011 the US government has once again performed its 
intention to play a greater role in Asia Pacific. In front of the Asia Pacific leaders 
during East Asia summit in Indonesia, President Obama specifically explained the vital 
role of Pacific Rim for the US interest. Ultimately, Obama urged the need to secure and 
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protect the US’ and her partners’ interest in maritime Asia Pacific.56 The initiative to 
focus more on Asia Pacific has actually been proposed since 2001. The US Department 
of Defence published her defence strategy that demands her armed forces to provide 
flexible capabilities for wider purposes and contingencies as they intended to expand 
their overseas presence from Middle East to Pacific littoral.57  
This statement obviously confirms the US’s willingness to stretch out their 
strategic plan to Pacific region, and it is usually associated with their influence and 
power. Moreover, to implement their defence strategy in Asia Pacific, the US military 
power needs sufficient capabilities since, as noted earlier, Pacific region is not free from 
disturbances. In addition, these capabilities should be flexible as it is mainly directed 
for dealing with traditional and non-traditional threats, including the humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief.  
The 2001 US defence strategy is subsequently supported by its 2007 maritime 
strategy, which also confirmed the shift of US’s focus to Pacific oceans.58 This 
maritime strategy essentially allows the US sea services, namely the US Navy, Marine 
Corps and Coast Guard, to cooperate and station a credible combat power in the 
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. This US’s seapower is particularly aimed to 
protect their vital interests and promote greater collective security, stability, and trust, 
as well as to defend their national security and to defeat adversaries in war.59  
Furthermore, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates in June 2010 mentioned 
that as part of Pacific nations, the US sets Asia Pacific region within its defence 
priorities in broader context.60 These priorities according to Bradford, clearly 
demonstrates that maintaining safe, secure sea-lane and upholding the principle of 
freedom of navigation in Pacific waters is at the very core of the US interests.61 In so 
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doing, Erickson confirms that the US has launched new direction for its maritime 
strategy since 2005. He explained that Adm. Michael Mullen, has been calling for a 
series Global Maritime Partnerships that brings the maritime force of friendly nations to 
join together to provide collective security against threats in the seas. 62 This means the 
US naval forces realized they could not handle all problems at sea alone due to its size 
and complexities. Therefore they are committed to collaborate with others, namely 
Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, in maintaining the security of the Pacific and 
global maritime commons. 
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Chapter 4 
Security Dynamics in Asia Pacific and Sino-Japan Relationship 
 
4.1 Security Dynamics in Asia Pacific 
Asia-Pacific region is an essential maritime environment. Historically, this area became 
a great arena of contact between civilisation and of imperial wealth and power. Today, 
it becomes the stage for over half the world’s trade and the interests of great and 
potential great powers such as US, China and Japan.63 Subsequently, globalisation 
process has also affected Pacific maritime security environment. Tangredi, specifically 
mentioned that globalisation changes the maritime security environment and therefore 
impacts to the military forces that operate in and from the maritime environment.64  
Lawrence S. Prabhakar notes in his article that the Asia Pacific region is a 
globalised maritime environment with the emphasis not only on states’ economic 
improvement but also on an increasingly significance of transnational maritime threat to 
its security.65 The number of economic cooperation in Asia Pacific has increased due to 
its attractiveness to states’ economic development. The principles of trade liberalization 
are arguably giving positive effects to national welfare.  
In addition, the regionalism has been strengthened since a global free trade is still 
far from complete.66 Accordingly, many states in Asia Pacific region pursue their 
economic growth through cooperation. Their cooperation is in turn articulated and 
implemented in free trade agreements, both bilaterally and multilaterally namely APEC 
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and AFTA 
(ASEAN Free Trade Area).  
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Nonetheless, the economic growth and cooperation in Asia Pacific region is also 
associated with an increasing numbers of transnational threats, which happens at sea. 
Kimberley Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi define transnational threats as crime activities 
perpetrated by non-state actors that not only go beyond national borders but also have 
global impact. Based on this definition, they subsequently distinguish the transnational 
crime perpetrators into two types of non-state actors, namely terrorist groups and 
organized criminal groups.67  
With regards to terrorist groups, some decades ago their activities were more 
politically driven and therefore threatened only the security at national level. In the last 
decade, their activities are more intensely carried out and globally directed. In addition, 
they are also using same methods that carried out by organized crime groups to finance 
their organizations. This is to mention drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money 
laundering, human trafficking, and piracy. Accordingly, Thachuk and Tangredi 
conclude that the line between terrorist motivations and criminal enterprises recently 
becomes gradually blurred. 
In the case of maritime Asia Pacific, terrorist attacks have become a major 
problem. Some militant Islamic groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyya in Indonesia, Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines were predicted to have 
connection with Al Qaeda. Subsequently, some terrorist observers are perceived that 
these groups have an intention to attack the Strait of Malacca.68 Once this attack 
happens, it obviously creates a huge economic damage. This damage in turn impacts 
not only the local government but also other states that rely on Malacca Straits, 
particularly the US, the main target of the Al Qaeda. 
In relation to piracy threats, as reported by IMB (International Maritime Bureau), 
there were 544 pirate attacks in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesian and 
Malaysian coastal waters from 2003 to 2007.69 It was nearly 36% of all piracy attacks in 
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all seas in the world. However, ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) Commercial 
Crime Services reported that the number of piracy crimes in the Strait of Malacca has 
dropped lately. This happens due to the increase and aggressive patrols by the littoral 
states authorities since July 2005. Although the pirate attacks can be reduced, it remains 
concerned by some states in Asia Pacific region as there were at least 50 incidents of 
piracy happened in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Straits and the South China Seas in 
the first six months of 2011.70  
Interestingly, as mentioned by Chinese government in its White Defence Paper 
201071, the Asia Pacific security situation has become more complex. The threats not 
only come from non-traditional actors such as those mentioned above, but mainly from 
states. Indeed, traditional security continues to become the most concerning problems in 
this region. Some of these traditional problems are related to sea territorial boundaries 
such as that happen in South China Sea as well as East Sea with their overlapping 
claims. This is not to mention the unsolved sovereignty problem of Chinese-Taiwan 
relationships with regards to ‘One China’ policy, and in turn this tension influences the 
US-Sino relationship.  
In addition, there is also tension in Pacific region, which is caused by arms 
dynamics and as a consequence, it leads to military competition. This happens 
particularly between China and Japan lately. This military competition subsequently 
also triggers military alliances between major powers and developing countries in this 
region, such as military exercises carried out by Australian, India, Japan and the US. 
However, this alliance intensifies the tension itself. Furthermore, the complexity of 
nuclear proliferation in North Korea that has been developed since the late 1950s 
remains a problem in this region.  
These traditional as well as non-traditional threats inevitably force Pacific states 
to employ certain strategies to deal with the existing and potential problems. There are 
at least three factors that affect the defence development particularly on naval power in 
Asia-Pacific region. This is to mention the importance role of SLOC, the increased of 
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economic prosperity in Pacific States, and an increase in transnational crimes in 
maritime Pacific. 
 
4.1.1  Securing the SLOCs 
Seas hold a vital function for humankind for centuries. They have provided a great 
benefit such as for navigation and transport, as a source of food and mining, recreation 
and tourism, materials for building and art as well as energy source and production of 
fresh water.72 In the globalisation era, sea becomes more important as nation welfare 
most likely depends on the free trade, which primarily uses sea. Geoffrey Till mentions 
there are two reasons why states choose the sea-based trading system. Firstly, it is 
cheaper and safer to travel and to send goods by sea, and secondly, it arguably makes 
big profits to states that use the system.73 
Sea is the medium by which 90 percent of world trade has been transported.74 This 
also confirms the vital function of the maritime Asia Pacific for making the goods 
possible to flow around the world. Nearly 60,000 vessels pass through the Strait of 
Malacca carrying various cargoes every year.75 The Strait of Malacca is becoming very 
important since it is the main entrance and the shortest sea route for vessels that brings 
oil and petroleum from Persian Gulf to East Asia. Further, approximately 30% of the 
world’s trade and 50% of its oil products pass through the Strait of Malacca, from the 
Persian Gulf to Japan, South Korea, China, and other Pacific states, including the U.S.76  
Based on the above description, Pacific countries depend on the free flow of this 
strait notably for their economic as well as military interests. In accordance with this 
interest, they need to adopt such a maritime strategy and naval development to secure 
and to protect the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in maritime Asia Pacific. 
The US Navy and Marine Corps, for example, in 1994 published their strategy in a 
white paper entitled “Forward...From the Sea,” which was rearticulated from the 
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   accessed	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previous paper in 1992 “....From the Sea.” This strategy primarily allows US maritime 
authority to deal with a global maritime threat as well as to project power and influence 
across broad oceans, primarily in maritime Asia Pacific. This is important, as they need 
to protect the US vital interest, in the sense of economic, political and military, which is 
perceived global in nature and scope.77 
 
4.1.2  Economic Prosperity 
As a set of processes involving the growing multi-directional flows of people, objects, 
and information,78 globalisation is perceived to bring economic growth and national 
welfare to states. And since the globalisation relies on the sea security, many maritime 
strategists assume that maritime security is a prerequisite for a stable and growing 
global economy. After all, most of the world commerce travels across the high seas has 
become a source of national welfare. The national welfare to a greater extent positively 
influences the naval development, which in turn supports their economic growth. The 
successful American economy, for example, is the basis for American political and 
military power, as well as her sea power, in the world.79  
The economic growth coupled with the essential function of navies to protect their 
sea-based trading system in globalization era inevitably lead states to increase their 
defense expenditure, particularly for their naval capabilities. China is the case. As her 
economic has grown over the last decade she also increased her defence expenditure 
11.7 – 20.3 per cent annually.80 Despite the fact that Chinese government did not 
openly publish their naval spending they allow PLA Navy to build its naval and missile 
forces by procuring nuclear-powered submarines, frigates, amphibious landing craft 
warships, fighter bombers, aircraft missiles and air-craft carrier as well as destroyers. 
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These destroyers are also completed with supersonics and anti-ship cruise missiles. 
China has actually started these procurements since the year 2000.81  
 
4.1.3 Dealing with Transnational Crimes 
With such ease and at great speed flows, globalisation brings not only positive impacts 
but also a number of negative aspects. This is to say the borderless diseases, natural 
disaster, transnational crimes, and terrorism.82 Kimberley Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi 
further distinguish the transnational crime perpetrators into two types of non-state 
actors, namely terrorist groups and organized criminal groups.83 Nonetheless, the 
difference between terrorist and criminal organizations has become gradually unclear. 
Terrorist groups carry out the same methods that are used by organized crime groups to 
finance their organizations namely drug trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, 
human trafficking, and piracy.  
Although the probability of terrorist attack in maritime Asia Pacific is low,84 a 
number of piracies and the possibility that terrorist groups use piracy model for their 
financial support create concern to Pacific states. As reported by International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB), there were 544 attacks in the Strait of Malacca, Singapore, Indonesian 
and Malaysian coastal waters from 2003 to 2007.85 Despite the largely decrease in the 
number of attacks as reported by the Commercial Crime Services, some Pacific states 
remain concerned with this problem. There were at least 50 incidents of piracy 
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happened in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Straits and the South China Seas in the 
first semester of 2011.86  
In addition to non-traditional threats, states in Pacific region basically continue to 
face existing traditional problems. This is to say the territorial boundaries dispute not 
only in land but mainly in sea, such as that happens between China and Japan as well as 
China and some Southeast Asia countries with regards to the East and South China 
Seas. There is also vulnerability between China and Taiwan in the sense of sovereignty 
issue, which then influences the Sino-U.S relations. This is not to mention the nuclear 
proliferation, which head for instability in the region. To deal with these traditional and 
non-traditional threats, Pacific states obviously have to set up certain naval and defence 
strategy. This is particularly true for China and Japan. 
 
4.2 Sino-Japan Action-Reaction 
The previous chapters have explicitly explained how Japan feels vulnerable due to 
China defence strategy, particularly the PLAN modernization. In turn, Japan reacted in 
the similar way by changing her defence strategy.87 As above-mentioned, Japan 
replaced its Cold War era defence strategy into the so-called “Dynamic Defence Force” 
which shifted its view about China and permits Japan Self Defence Forces to have 
power projection. This is an additional to Japanese strategy to strengthen its allies with 
the US and collaboration with other Pacific States. The military collaboration can be 
seen through the Global Maritime Partnership Strategy, initiated by the US. 
Although Chinese and Japanese governments have shown dramatic power 
acquisitions both quantitatively and qualitatively, it is too early to evaluate if they are 
heading for war. The gap of military capability between China and Japan is still too big, 
which causes Japan not to activate war initially. As a comparison, the table below 
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shows what China and Japan navies have in details, as reported by the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency88  
Military Strength China (3rd world 
rank) 
Japan (9th world 
rank) 
Active Military Personnel 2,285,000 239,430 
Active Military Reserves 800,000 57,899 
Total Aircraft 5,176 1,953 
Total Land-Based Weapons 47,575 5,220 
Total Naval Units 972 110 
Towed Artillery 25,000 480 
Merchant Marine Strength 2,012 673 
Major Ports and Terminals 8 10 
Aircraft Carriers 1 0 
Destroyers 25 10 
Frigates 47 36 
Submarines 63 16 
Patrol Coastal Craft 332 6 
Mine Warfare Craft 52 29 
Amphibious Operations Craft 233 25 
Defense Budget / Expenditure $100,000,000,000 $70,495,000,000 
Coastline Coverage 14,500 km 29,751 km 
 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Report 
In addition, to some observers, China-Japan interdependence in economies 
restrains both states from doing regrettable actions.89 Moreover, an increased in non-
traditional threats, namely natural disaster, illegal smuggling, piracy and terrorist 
attacks call states for collaboratively dealing with them. With respect to overlapping 
claims on the Senkaku/Diayou actually perform Japan and China mutual interests. Their 
common interest, in turn, forces them to manage the dispute cooperatively.  
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However, Sino-Japan action-reaction on military strategy and weapon 
modernization cause an inevitable security dilemma in the region. Their military 
strategies not only promote tensions for both parties. It also creates insecurity and 
provokes tension for other Pacific states. Currently tensions due to arms race, coupled 
with some unresolved problems with neighboring countries, such as overlapping claims 
on South China Sea and Taiwan issue, clearly trigger instability in East Asia.  
In addition, diplomacy carried out by Chinese government in accordance with a big 
number and capability of military equipment tend to cause its neighbor states to 
perceive that China is going to intimidate them. This is true particularly for Taiwan, 
Vietnam and the Philippines. Regarding this, Hu Jintao confirms that China’s peaceful 
development mechanism - which is aimed to justify her weapon modernization - is 
mainly used for China-Taiwan reunification and protecting China’s national 
sovereignty.90 Essentially, this emphasizes what Al Capone says, “You can get further 
with a kind word and a gun than you can with just a kind word.”91 
 
4.3 Pacific States Responses 
As above-mentioned, China’s military strategy as well as Japan’s response, has also led 
its neighbors in Pacific Region to react in a similar strategy. As they feel threatened by 
both defence strategies, they precisely publish their defence development. As confirmed 
in its Defence Policy, Vietnam, for example, has developed its defence powers and 
closely coordinated defence-security and diplomatic activities in the last decade. The 
2006 defence budget was increased 20.89% from USD 781.34 million to USD 987.70 
million. It was then increased 28.85% in 2007 and became USD 1,388.26 million. It 
was slightly decreased in 2008, but then dramatically increased to become USD 2,6 
billion in 2011 and USD 3,3 billion in 2012.92  
Like Vietnam, the Philippines have also established a tranformation in its defence 
strategy since 2003. Under the Philippines Defence Reform, the government focuses on 
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10 key areas, such as improvement of operational and training capacity, improvement 
of logistics capacity, personnel management systems, and level expertise, optimizing 
the defence budget and improving management controls, and also increasing the 
capability of the Armed Forces of Philippines to conduct civil military operations.93 
Initially, along with the US, the defence reform is directed to respond the 9/11 
terrorist’s attack. Yet, the program is specifically containing the mission to protect the 
Philippines national territory and its Exclusive Economic Zone from external 
aggression and transnational threats.94 
Moreover, the Philippines government has performed an assertive stand towards 
China with regard to Scarborough Shoal issue, since 1994. A recent standoff has just 
ensued when a Philippine navy surveillance plane sighted eight Chinese fishing vessels 
anchored in a lagoon at Scarborough in April 2012. Based on a report form Filipino 
sailors, the Philippines navy then deployed its largest warship, the BRP Gregorio del 
Pilar to the region.95  
The Philippines later withdrew its warship, but China sent out two Fishery Law 
Enforcement Command vessels. China’s act obviously provokes standoff to escalate, 
with the Philippines requesting a diplomatic resolution to the crisis but refusing to 
retreat.  Bilateral relations have quickly deteriorated, as China introduces restrictions on 
imports of Philippine bananas and calls on tour groups to leave, causing a severe blow 
to the Philippine economy.  Moreover, the Chinese media is talking of war and 
provoking both citizens, although a fishing ban implemented by both sides may let 
tensions subside. 96 
Instability in the region, to some extent, is also caused by both Japan and China 
historical record. Japan was an invader during the World War II and created severe 
pains for many Pacific states. Thus, its military development and defence cooperation 
with US might be considered a threat. Similarly, China is assumed as a revisionist 
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power in the way it dominates Pacific waters and approaches Taiwan. Although China 
government tries to manage some negotiations and arrange economic cooperation with 
Southeast Asian countries and Taiwan, they still use “carrot and stick” approaches. 
China combines its financial assistances with coercion and intimidation to support its 
goals. This can be clearly seen, for example, in its “One China” policy, as President Hu 
Jintao ratified the “Anti-Secession Law” in March 2005. 97 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The decision made by Chinese Government to modernize her military capabilities, 
which is supported by her amazing economic growth, certainly has its own purpose and 
logical rationale. As they said, it is mainly used for defensive purpose, such as for the 
personnel training and equipment maintenance. It is also aiming to improve the PLA’s 
living standards as well as to support the diversified military tasks in terms of military 
operations other than war (MOOTW) and PLA’s Revolution Military Affairs. The latter 
is vital, as China has to deal with both traditional and non-traditional threats. Moreover, 
during the implementation of her defence strategy over the last decade, China has also 
been publicizing her peaceful military rise through diplomacy as well as media.  
Chinese government may explain their peaceful development. However, it is not 
fully understood by her neighbor states in Asia Pacific. They perceive oppositely, in 
particular Japan. The reality of China and Japan as major powers in Pacific region is a 
truth. Economic developments in the two countries coupled with military power 
signalize their superior. Their trade and investments interdependence as well as 
common interest in Senkaku/Diayou islands, certainly encourage their positive 
relationship and cooperation. Nonetheless, a significant transformation in China’s 
defence power since 2000s, to a greater extent, brings tension to the relationship 
between China and Japan, as well as instability to the Pacific region.  
Instead of being more confident, Japan feels less secure with the PLA military 
development. Japan then shifts her defence strategy that views China and North Korea 
as her threat. Accordingly Japanese government transforms her military posture and 
spends more military expenditures. Japan also relishes mutual defence cooperation with 
the United States and strongly utilizes their strategic partnership, together with other 
Pacific states, such as the Philippines and Australia. The strategy inevitably brings both 
countries to enter into arms race.  
The arm dynamic between China and Japan, in turn, promotes tension between two 
states as well as their neighbors in the region. The tension obviously causes Asia Pacific 
region become unstable. Instability is Asia Pacific is also worsened by the assumptions 
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of other countries in the region for these potential superpowers. These perceptions come 
up with their history and behavior in connection with some existing problems, mainly 
China. As a response, other Pacific states also conduct military modernization, in 
particular those who have territorial claims on South China Sea. Yet, this counter-
balance strategy leads Pacific states to an unresolved tension. This tension subsequently 
impacts to the instability of Asia Pacific region. 
Political issue and territorial disputes coupled with historical suspiciousness cause 
the relationships of Pacific states to become more vulnerable. Although economic 
interdependence prevents their robust military activities, the tension should be sent 
down to maintain the peace and stability in the region. This ultimately needs political 
willingness from all parties in Asia Pacific region, particularly China and Japan, to self-
restrain, build trust one to another and arrange comprehensive strategic partnerships. 
The latter should also be conducted with other Pacific states in a cooperative way. 
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